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ABSTRACT 
 
This research aims to test the impact of the ownership structure toward the performance of the State-
Owned Enterprises (SOEs). It examines the relationship between the performance of the SOEs and 
the market value. The study involves 13 SOEs listed at the Jakarta Stock Exchange. Of the 13 SOEs, 
9 were selected as samples. The performance of the SOEs is measured by means of the EVA 
(Economic Value Added) indicator and the market value by the MVA (Market Value Added) 
indicator. The result of the study reveals that the ownership structure does not have an impact on the 
performance of the SOEs, either partially or simultaneously. To a smaller degree, the study also 
indicates that there is a relationship between the EVA and the MVA. The implication of this study is 
that the privatization of the SOEs should not fully be used to help with the state budget deficit. That 
is, the majority of the funds should be allocated for the purpose of developing or expanding the 
SOEs themselves so that they can perform optimally for the sake of society. Furthermore, the SOEs 
should be well-managed if they would like to obtain good responses from the market. 
 
Keywords:  ownership stucture, performance of SOEs, market value, EVA, MVA. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
  
he State Owned Enterprise (SOE) is one of the institutions managed by the state to achieve and 
improve the prosperity for the public. This article will examine the impact of the privatization on the 
performance of the SOEs in Indonesia. The act of privatization is normally taken to change the 
ownership structure of the SOEs in order to improve their performance. According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), 
in addition to being determined by equity and debt, the performance of a company is determined by the percentage 
in ownership since the ownership structure might be related with the control of the company. 
 
The goal of privatization, as described earlier, is to improve the value of the company (value creation) 
which means improving the leverage of the assets, as well as by inviting the private sector to own SOEs. The  
privatization strategy can be conducted  through Initial Public Offering (IPO), private placement by strategic 
investors and/or private placement by financial institutions. The ideal privatization is through IPO. If conditions are 
not favorable, for example because the situation of the capital market is bearish and or the company is not ready to 
go public, another choice should be considered. By involving strategic investors, it is hoped that fresh funds 
(especially foreign currency) can be generated, which is very much required by the goverment to provide much 
needed capital for the SOEs, transfer of technology and expertise can be improved, the global market can be 
accessed, and the efficiency and value of the company value as a whole can be increased.  
 
Some empirical literatures on the  privatization phenomena in developing countries were generally 
conducted pursuant to experience in developed countries with certain restrictions (Megginson, Nash & 
Randenborgh, 1994). The research by the World bank estimates  advantages and disadvantages of privatization in 12 
companies in the noncompetitive market in 4 countries, Chile, Malaysia, Mexico, and The United Kingdom. The 
conclusion of the research showed that there was increasing prosperity in 11 of 12 cases. No single case of  losses 
was found (Galat et al, 1994). 
T 
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 In relation to the monitoring activity on the management policy, the ownership structure of the shares is 
divided by Brailsford, Moon, Rao (1996) into stockholders of institution, individuals, and managerial. According to 
Cook and Kirkpatrick (1995), with regard to property rights and corporate control, the ownership structure can be 
grouped into two models, that is, outsider model and insider model. The insider model is very widely used in 
Western Europe and Japan,  whereas the outsider model is popular in the United States. For the ousider model, 
ownership is spread and control is separated for every owner. Stockholders (commercial banks) are not active in the 
policy of the management. For the insider model, ownership is concentrated and the control by ownership 
association is stronger. The core investors of the insider model actively participate in the company management. 
Such investors are actively protecting the value of the company. 
 
According to D’Souza & Magginson (1999), privatized companies are more efficient. The conclusions 
were based on annual reports, and other secondary data resources in the capital market. It was found that operating 
and financial performance of the company have improved after privatization has been implemented.  
 
However, we may ask whether the privatization program has really improved the performance of the SOEs. 
The privatization of the SOEs normally results in change of ownership of public asset to the  private  investor. 
Hence, the change of the ownership structure correlates with the improvement of the company performance 
(Megginson, Nash and Randenborgh, 1994; D’Souza and Megginson, 1999; Boubakri and Cosset, 1994; Su, Tong, 
and Barrel, 2002; Sun & Barrel, 2002). 
 
In contrast to the studies of Sun & Barrel (2002) and Sun, Tong, and Barrel (2002), the government 
ownership has shown a positive impact on the performance of the SOEs in China and  Malaysia. However, Sun, 
Tong, and Barrel (2002), also concluded in their research that 100% government ownership  of the SOEs in China is 
bad, but lack of government ownership is not good either. This result is consistent with the studies by Morck, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1988), Mcconnell & Servaes (1990), Holderness, Kroszner, and Sheehan (1999), which show 
that the companies in the United States have an inverted U-shape pattern with respect to the relationship between the 
managerial ownership and the performance of the company. 
  
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
 
Improving the performance of the SOEs can be implemented through privatization. One of the methods is 
by selling the shares at the stock exchange or by going public. However, we should first ask whether privatization 
improves the performance of the SOEs. Furthermore, we may also ask how the diminishing ownership role of the 
government affects the performance of the SOEs. Based on these questions, we therefore can formulate the research 
questions as follows. First, will the ownership structure affect the performance of the SOEs? Second, what is the 
relationship between the the EVA and the MVA of SOEs in Indonesia? 
  
THE RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
 
The objectives of the research can be formulated as follows: 
 
a. To determine to what extent the ownership structure of the SOEs affects their performance; 
b. To understand the relationship between the EVA and the MVA of SOEs in Indonesia. 
  
RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS  
 
This study is expected to provide contributions in the following areas: 
 
a. The developments of science, especially in the field of financial management. It is hoped that this study 
will support and strengthen the study of the financial management theory in general and the study of 
privatization, especially those that have been previously implemented in different conditions. 
b. The results of the study can serve as input for the government and other institutions, especially when 
making a decision on whether privatization will be implemented through the capital market by IPO or by 
other means. 
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c. Another benefit of this study is that the results can be used as a reference for decision making in 
determining the financial strategy related to the ownership structure. 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
 
The object in this research is the performance of SOEs and the ownership structure of the SOEs that have 
gone public in the Indonesian capital market.  
 
This research is in the field of finance management, especially the performance evaluation of the SOEs 
listed at the Jakarta Stock Exchange (JSX) and the ownership structure of the SOEs in their efforts to reach the 
specified goals. This research, an event study research, seeks to determine the performance of the SOEs before and 
after their listing at the Jakarta Stock Exchange. Furthermore this research aims to test the impact of the ownership 
structure on the performance of the SOEs at the JSX. Hence, this research can also be conceived as a hypothesis 
testing research or explanatory research. The ownership structure in this research is the independent variable, while 
the performance of the SOEs constitutes the dependent variable.  
 
The research samples consist of all SOEs which have been privatized through IPO (initial public offering) 
in the Indonesia capital market at the Jakarta stock exchange. The research population target is all SOEs which have 
gone public at the Jakarta Stock Exchange, except banks and financial institutions (credit insurance agency and 
investment firms). This choice is supported by Jensen and Meckling (1976), who stated that ”highly regulated 
industries such as public utulities or banks, will have higher debt equity ratios for equivalent level of risk than the 
average non- regulated firms”. 
 
 The data in this research is quantitative secondary data, in the form of the financial reports from the 
companies  published  periodically, in addition to other information related to the capital market published by the 
Jakarta stock exchange, especially the data on the  financial statements of the companies and the stocks market data 
three years after going public. 
 
  The research models used in finance management, such as EVA, MVA, WACC, are used to measure the 
performance of the SOEs. In addition, the statistical model used to determine the impact of the ownership structure 
toward the financial performance of the SOEs is conducted through multiple regression. 
 
The performance of the SOEs will be measured by using the EVA (Economic Value Added) and the MVA 
(Market Value Added). 
 
The operational variable and the research model can be stated as follows: 
  
A. EVA = EBIT (1-tax) - (total capital) (cost of capital) 
 
EBIT   = Earning Before interest and tax  
Tax   = company tax rate  
Total capital  = include the long term liabilities, preferent stocks, and common stocks 
Cost of capital = Weighted cost of capital  ( WACC) 
  
B. MVA =  value of equity –  invested  capital by the investor = (outstanding share) (market price) - (total 
equity) 
  
To determine the impact of the ownership structure towards the performance, the multiple regression model 
is used. Operationally, the model can be stated as follows: 
  
EVA = a + b1 (% ownership of the public) + b2 (% ownership of the government) + b3 (% ownership of 
the institution) + et  
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EVA   = Performance of SOE  
X1  = Percentage ownership of the public  
X2  = Percentage ownership of the government  
X3  = Percentage  ownership of the institution  
 
To determine the relation between the EVA and the MVA, y the correlation analysis is used with equation 
of statistics as follows: 
 
MVA = a + b EVA+ e 
 
RESULT DISCUSSION 
 
As stated earlier, the goal of this research is to determine whether the ownership structure affects the 
performance of the SOEs with respect to their economic added value. In addition, we will also  see whether there is 
a relationship between the performances of the SOEs and the market value of the company in the Indonesian capital 
market. 
 
 Up to 2007, the SOEs were privatized through IPO (Initial Public Offering), 13 of which were chosen as 
research samples. Three of the SOEs are banks and the other 10 SOEs are non-banks. These 13 SOEs have gone 
public from 1990 up to 2007.  
 
In 1990, the government  began to exploit the capital market in the effort to seek fresh funds for the 
financing of SOEs. Through IPO at the capital market, the ownership structure  of  the SOEs has changed. Initialy 
100% of the SOEs shares were owned by Republic of Indonesia (the government). After IPO, however, the 
ownership of the shares was spread. On average, the ownership structure of the SOEs is split into three big groups, 
namely ownership by government, ownership by public, and ownership by others. Figure 1 below summarizes the 
percentages of the three groups. 
 
 
Figure 1:  Percentage of the Ownership of the SOEs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From the 13 SOEs that have gone public, we have selected 10 non-banks as the target population. For 
analysis purposes and  by using the chosen model from the population target, the 3 year data of 10 SOEs from 2004 
up to 2006 was collected. The three years was chosen because some of SOEs launched IPO in the year 2003, hence 
the complete data for the period avalaible was selected from 2004 to 2006. 
 
Calculating phases begin from the calculation the Cost of Equity, Cost of Debt, and Cost of Capital. For the 
he cost of equity calculation, the author used the CAPM (capital asset pricing model). The risk free interest rate is 
Government
 61,27%
Others
 14,16%
Public
 30,08%
International Business & Economics Research Journal – July 2009 Volume 8, Number 7 
23 
the governmental fixed income interest rate with 5 to 6 year maturity. The fixed income interest rate is the risk free 
rate, not the Central Bank of Indonesia rate (SBI). Considering that the policy of financing is long term one, the 
author is of the opinion that it is more justified to use the government fixed income rate rather than the Central Bank 
of Indonesia rate, which will be mature at the latest in 3 months (Kester et al, 2005). The cost of capital is one of the 
data used to calculate the EVA, in which the capital expense is used to curtail the profit of the company multiplied 
by the invested capital. 
 
 The results of the EVA and the MVA calculation and their growth during the research period can be seen in 
Figure 2. On average, during the last 3 years, the performance of the SOEs in the Jakarta Stock Exchange (JSX) has 
increased, and so has the MVA of the SOEs. The MVA increased quite amazingly in 2006. This improvement was 
in line with the increasing of the performance of the JSX during that year (i.e., the Jakarta Composit Index was the 
highest during that period). 
 
 In general, the SOEs which have gone public have the positive EVA. This means that the investments have 
yielded an economic added value which can increase the value of the company. If seen from its growth during the 
research period, however, there was a decreasing tendency. 
 
The calculation result of the MVA (market value added) of the SOEs reveals that 50% experienced a 
decrease in the year 2005 and 50% experienced an increase. This show that there is an increase of the market value 
for 50% of the SOEs, while the rest suffered a decrease. The Increase and decrease are determined by the change of 
the price of shares as well as by the performance of the SOEs. In 2006, all of the SOEs showed a better performance 
compared to the previous year, i.e., in this year there was a rise of 90 % of the market value of the company. This 
increase is in general triggered by the external factors supporting the booming of the capital market both in 
Indonesia and in other countries. This increase can be seen through the increase  of the composite capital index by 
the end of 2006 which reached its highest point in that year. On the other hand, the internal factors of the SOEs 
(EVA) did not support the increase of the market value (MVA) significantly. 
 
For the purposes of analysis and to fulfill the statistical requirements, the author had to omit some the data, 
namely the data of Kimia Farma tbk, and the one-year data of PT Gas Negara tbk. The overall data collected 
consists of 3 types of ownership structure, i.e., ownership by the government, ownership by the public, and 
ownership by others. The ownership of others comprises the ownership by the employees and by the corporations. 
However, not all of the SOEs have the ownership by others. In general, the ownership of SOEs is still dominated by 
the government of Indonesia (appr. 90%). Because the data on ownership by others is not even, it is not possible  to 
fulfill the statistical model. Therefore, the author decided that only two types of ownership structure, namely the 
ownership by the government and ownership by the public, were selected. With these two independent variables, a 
better statistical model can be attained. 
 
The model testing was conducted using multicollinierity and autocorelation test. The multicollinierity test 
of  the regression model used to show VIF 1.602< 3.33 reveals that there is no multicollinierity. Autocorelation test 
showing DW 1.798 > DL=1.22 reveals that there is no autocorelation (see exhibit 1). Therefore, the multiple linier 
regression model in the research is considered fit. 
 
The first research hypothesis test was conducted by using F test to test the impact of the ownership 
structure on the performance of all SOEs with the level of significant value that reached 95%. The result obtained 
was a probability score of 0.086 (Exhibit 1). Since 0.086 is greater than 0,05, it can statistically be concluded that 
the result of the hypothesis test is not significant. Therefore, the null hypothesis should be accepted. Based on this 
statistical test, it can  be assumed that the ownership structure of the SOEs in Indonesia does not  affect their 
financial performance. 
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Figure 2:  The Average EVA and MVA during 3 Years in 10 of the SOE’s 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 If the R-sq (adj) value is equal to 12,2% (Exhibit 1),  the model does not fit if used as a prediction model. 
However, it can be stated that the two independent variables, i.e., ownership by the government and ownership by 
the public, can still be used to predict the EVA, and they affect the performance of the SOEs. That is, the impact of 
the ownership structure towards EVA is 12,2% , while the rest (87.8%) came from other factors. 
 
 To test the hypothesis on whether or not ownership by the government and ownership by the public affect 
the performance of the SOEs partially, the t test was used with a level of significant value of 95%. The result 
obtained from the statistical  calculation is that the p value is equal 0,202 (exhibit 1) for the public ownership and 
0,475 (Exhibit 1) for the government ownership. Both values are greater than 0,05, the null hypothesis should be 
accepted. This means that partially both types of ownership do not affect the performance of the SOEs.  
 
The second hypothesis test seeks to determine whether there is a relationship between the MVA and the 
EVA. The null  hypothesis states that there is no relationship between the MVA and  the EVA, the calculation result  
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is the pearson correlation with value of 0.447 (Exhibit 2) with a  p value of 0,02. Because 0,02 is smaller than 0,05, 
hence statistically there is a significant correlation and, therefore, the null hypothesis should be rejected. This means 
that there is a positive relation between the EVA and the MVA of the SOEs. There is a tendency that an Increase of 
the EVA  correlates with an increase of the MVA although this relation is not overwhelming. 
 
The results of the fist hypóthesis shows that the ownership structure of the SOEs in Indonesia does not 
affect the performance of  theSOEs.  Regarding the ability to predict, it can be said that both independent variables, 
that is, ownership by government and  ownership by the public, can still be used to predict the EVA and it affects 
the performance of  the EVA if the  EVA reaches 12,2%. This finding is consistent with that found by Lauterbach & 
Vaninsky (1999), i.e., ownership structure does not have a significant effect on the performance for the industrial 
sector sample. This finding is further supported by the research results of Vining and Boardman (1992); Boardman 
et al (1989), and Megginson, Nash, and Randenborgh (1994). Furthermore, Kusnetsov and Muravyyev (2001) 
showed that companies owned by the government have lower efficiency compared to those owned by private sector. 
They also found that the relationship between ownership of shares by government and performance is negative. 
 
 In contrast, the study conducted by Lauterbach & Vaninsky (1999) stated that modern companies with a 
spread ownership of share perform better than traditional ones. Lemon and Lins (2003) examined the relationship 
between the ownership structure and the company value during the crisis period in 8 Asian Countries. They 
concluded that only the ownership by the management at the highest level increases the company performance by 
20%. The research that connects the ownership structure with the performance of the private companies also 
concluded that the structure of ownership has an effect on the performance of the company (see Palmer, 1973; 
Stano, 1976; Levin and Levin, 1982; Murali & Welch, 1989). 
 
 The privatization of the SOEs in Indonesia aims to improve the performance of the SOEs. Privatization 
results in the change of ownership in the SOEs in which the government will no longer  be the 100 % shareholder. 
Through the ownership of the public or  private sector outside the old stockholder (government), it is  expected that 
control towards the company or public assets will become better, so that in turn the company performance will 
increase (Syakhoroza, 2000; Cragg and Dyck, 1999). The research result of 9 SOEs which have gone public, 
however indicates, that the ownership structure of the SOEs in Indonesia does not have much impact towards the 
performance of the SOEs. It seems that the ownership structure will apply more effectively for private companies 
rather than for SOEs. It should be noted, however,  that inconsistency with the result may be caused by the policy of 
the government to maximize the political and social purposes rather than to maximize profits of the SOEs 
(Megginson, Nash, Rodenborgh, 1994). That is,  the social purpose factor of the SOEs is more dominant compared 
to the similar factor that applies to the private enterprises. This is in line with the general opinion (see Boycho, 
Sheefer, Vishny, 1996; Dewenter and  Malatesta, 2001 in Sun, Tong & Barrel, 2002). In addition, the ownership 
structure is still dominated by the government, which makes it difficult to implement good corporate management 
required to reach good financial performance. 
 
The ownership structure of the SOEs in Indonesia can be said to imitate the model generally used in the 
United Kingdom and in the US. That is, there are a lot of individual  investors who are able to sell their ownership in 
short-range and quickly, and in general such investors are not interested in being involved in the management of the 
SOEs. It seems that this condition is created by the government of Indonesia since the privatization of the SOEs 
aims  to decrease  the state deficit,  rather than to improve the performance of the SOEs. 
 
 As for the second hypothesis, there is a positive correlation between the EVA and the MVA although not 
overwhelming. The result explains why the EVA as an assessment indicator of the performance of the SOEs, 
although the relationship is weak, can improve the share market price of the SOEs listed at Jakarta  stock exchange. 
Furthermore, it can be argued that the MVA has not yet fully reflected the information of the EVA. The result of this 
research supports the study conducted by Hendry (1999). The result is also in line with the research conducted by 
Ramana in Indian capital market (http://ssrn.com/abstract), who concluded that there is a relationship between the  
MVA with EVA at Indian Companies, although not strong. 
 
Whether or not there is a correlation between the EVA and the MVA is very much determined by the 
capital market efficiency and by whether or not there is asymetric information, and other factors which influence the 
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share price, like the rate of interest of The Fed, the SBI, and the growth of the economy. With respect to these  
factors, it is possible that Indonesian capital market is truly not yet efficient and there still exists asymetric 
information. This situation can be caused by the placement of employees at the SOEs because of political network 
rather than of professionalism, by high asimetric information, and by high transaction cost (Megginson, Nash, 
Rodenborgh, 1994). 
  
CONCLUSION  
 
The ownership structure of the SOEs which is partially owned by the public, is unable to improve the 
economic added value. This may still occur because the ownership structure is dominated by the government. That 
is, the government still dominates the decision-making in the SOEs both for strategic and operational reasons. In 
addition, the SOEs, in Indonesia have to serve political and social purposes rather than profit-making purposes. 
 
The performance of SOEs, measured by the EVA (economic Value Added) correlates with the MVA 
(Market Value Added) as market indicator of public companies significantly. This result can mean that investors 
begin to possess adequate knowledge in assessing or evaluating public companies in the capital market. The relation 
shows that when the economic value  increases, the SOEs will undergo a change and this will affect the price of 
shares in the capital market. 
 
 The change of the  ownership structure through privatization actually does not have an impact towards the 
performance of the SOEs. This occurs because the ownership by the minority group does not result in the control of 
the SOEs. The Privatization is only conducted as an effort to obtain funds to help with the state budget deficit rather 
than to expand the SOEs or to improve the added value of the SOEs. 
 
SUGGESTIONS 
 
It is recommended that the acquired funds from the privatization of the SOEs not fully be used to 
compensate for the state budget deficit. That is, the majority of the funds should be allocated for the purpose of 
developing or expanding the SOEs themselves so that they can perform optimally for the sake of the society. 
 
Because the EVA and the MVA have a significant relationship to a certain degree, the author suggests that 
the SOEs attempt to improve their performance continually since the market openly evaluates the  activities of the  
SOEs, and the market will respond to the performance as shown by the price of the shares. The higher price reflects 
the better performance of the SOEs. 
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Exhibit 1:   Regression Analysis - EVA versus PUBLIC; GOV 
 
The regression equation is: 
 
EVA = - 3342526 + 218067 PUBLIC - 59844 GOV 
 
26 cases used, 2 cases contain missing values 
 
Predictor      Coef  SE Coef      T      P     VIF 
Constant   -3342526  9002439  -0,37  0,714 
 
Predictor      Coef  SE Coef      T      P     VIF 
Constant   -3342526  9002439  -0,37  0,714 
PUBLIC       218067   166204   1,31   0,202   1,602 
GOV          -59844    82482  -0,73   0,475   1,602 
 
S = 5858042   R-Sq = 19,2%   R-Sq(adj) = 12,2%   
 
PRESS = 1,057307E+15   R-Sq(pred) = 0,00% 
 
Analysis of Variance 
 
Source          DF           SS           MS     F      P 
Regression       2  1,87804E+14  9,39019E+13  2,74  0,086 
Residual Error  23  7,89283E+14  3,43167E+13 
  Lack of Fit   16  2,54598E+14  1,59124E+13  0,21  0,996 
  Pure Error     7  5,34685E+14  7,63836E+13 
Total           25  9,77087E+14 
14 rows with no replicates 
 
Source  DF       Seq SS 
PUBLIC   1  1,69739E+14 
GOV      1  1,80648E+13 
 
Unusual Observations 
 
Obs  PUBLIC        EVA       Fit   SE Fit   Residual  St Resid 
 13    19,3  -28333564  -3967419  2145544  -24366145     -4,47R 
 
R denotes an observation with a large standardized residual. 
 
Durbin-Watson statistic = 1,79807   
 
 
Exhibit 2:  Correlation EVA vs MVA 
 
 EVA MVA 
MVA Pearson correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
1 
 
26 
,447 
,022 
26 
EVA Pearson correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
,447 
,022 
26 
1 
 
26 
* Correlation is  significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
 
